

Report on

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**MINURCAT:  
Achievements, disappointments and a  
fragile future**

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An Assessment of the Security and the Protection  
of Civilians in Eastern Chad during the deployment  
period of The United Nations Mission in the  
Central African Republic and Chad II, March 2009 –  
February 2010

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**“We the people of Chad affirm our desire to live together in a spirit of respect for ethnic, religious, regional and cultural diversity, to build a State governed by the rule of law and a united nation based on civil liberties and fundamental human rights, the dignity of the individual and political pluralism, and the African values of solidarity and fraternity.”**

Excerpt from the Constitution of Chad

## Executive Summary

Insecurity, impunity and underdevelopment threaten civilian populations in eastern Chad despite the presence of the United Nations and repeated promises by the Government of Chad to improve the situation. Impoverished refugees, internally displaced persons and local communities remain exposed to banditry and tensions over scarce resources between populations continue to build. Humanitarian staff routinely fall victim to attacks and assistance is not reaching thousands in need. Stabilising eastern Chad will require concerted and mutually reinforcing efforts by international and national actors alike.

Overlapping domestic and regional factors underpin the insecurity in eastern Chad. Decades of neglect and endemic poverty has been the background to repeated bouts of civil war and cross-border hostilities that eventually caused the influx of 250,000 Sudanese refugees and the further displacement of 180,000 Chadians in the eastern region. While the worst of the conflict is now over, civilians and humanitarian staff remain at risk owing to the breakdown of law-and-order and rampant impunity. Attempts to strengthen justice remain superficial, particularly as the armed forces and politically connected individuals remain above the law.

*At the behest of the Government of Chad, the UN Security Council mandated, in September 2007, a multidimensional mission in eastern Chad. This consisted, initially, of: a UN civilian component (MINURCAT); the creation of a Chadian community police force, the Detachement Intégré de Sécurité (DIS), tasked with addressing insecurity in refugee camps and IDP areas, protecting humanitarian activities and building Chad's own community policing structure; and a transitional European-led military component, the 3,700-strong EUFOR, focused primarily on the protection of civilians, to be replaced by a 5,200-strong UN military force, MINURCAT II in March 2009, with a similar mandate.*

Although originally envisaged that MINURCAT presence in Chad would be needed until at least 2011, the Government of Chad recently notified the UN that it does not want to renew this mandate after March 2010. The Government has highlighted the UN Force's slow deployment, uncertain impact and the general change in the context that had originally justified an international military presence. While the United Nations' response has not achieved initial expectations owing to serious constraints, it is progressively, albeit slowly, improving localised security in some zones. Crucially, however, the UN Force and DIS are presently filling a void that the Government of Chad is incapable of maintaining and assuring in a comprehensive and accountable manner.

With UN Police support, the DIS has had a positive, if limited, impact; refugees and IDPs report that they feel safer where regular patrols are being provided. Internally, the DIS faces significant challenges during this early stage of development, such as inconsistent levels of professionalism, gender, ethnic and religious discrimination and corruption. Further, the lack of an independent mechanism for accountability means it will be many years before a truly “community police” culture emerges. Without continued refinement, mentoring and the establishment of monitoring system, the DIS risks collapse, in particular if the UN withdraws and the DIS loses UNPol support.

As of mid-February 2010, MINURCAT II Force deployment was still only around 68%, less than half of the helicopters pledged to the mission have been delivered, field bases are not completed owing to logistical delays and the new troop contingents do not always meet minimum Force Requirements. The force is therefore unable to carry out patrols during high-risk hours or in exposed locations, where most banditry occurs, and the porous border region is also left unpatrolled, by order of the Government of Chad. Time and resources are also absorbed escorting humanitarian workers - targeted by bandits - overstressing the Force's capacities. Nevertheless, refugees and IDPs support the Force's presence and gradual progress is being made in terms of improved security.

Regardless of the MINURCAT's exit date, protecting civilians from violence should be a priority. In this regard, the UN must ensure the sustainability of the DIS community policing force and strengthen Chad's faltering justice system; otherwise insecurity may dramatically increase upon its eventual departure. The Government of Chad must build upon the UN's advances and assume its sovereign responsibilities by genuinely committing to broad security sector reform aimed at ensuring the protection of civilians.


Beyond the immediate protection needs that the UN Force and DIS can provide for civilians, a longer term and sustainable response must address the structural factors that underpin instability in Chad: corruption, arms proliferation, poor governance and the lack of democracy. Without genuine efforts to overcome these factors, Chad will continue to remain one of the most unstable and poorest countries in the world.

## 1. Introduction

*Eastern Chad has been in a state of chronic emergency and underdevelopment for decades, it is a place where humanitarian, political, social and economic challenges are intertwined. Decades of neglect, civil war and regional instability underlie the humanitarian crisis that finally unfolded in 2003, when a quarter of a million refugees from Darfur fled into Chad, only to find themselves trapped within another conflict zone. From 2005 to 2007, Chad's internal fighting caused a further 180,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) to flee their homes and sources of livelihood.*

*While large-scale fighting ended in mid-2007, the complex situation continues to place enormous pressure on the already deeply impoverished region whose population struggles with malnutrition, water shortage, and ecological degradation. Compounding this situation, complete impunity and a break down of law-and-order has permitted violent and organised banditry to flourish.*

*Confronted with the dismal level of security and violence and at the request of the Government of Chad, in September 2007 the United Nations Security Council mandated the deployment of a multi-dimensional presence to eastern Chad. The mission consisted of a UN civilian component (MINURCAT), the creation of a Chadian community police force, the Detachement Intégré de Sécurité (DIS), and a transitional European led military component, EUFOR. In March 2009, EUFOR was finally replaced by a UN military force under a revised mandate, the MINURCAT II.*



Refugee tents in Touloum, home to approximately 26,000 Sudanese refugees

*The MINURCAT II, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, took over from EUFOR's stabilisation mission with a comparable mandate focused primarily on the*  
**Protection of Civilians** *with three components:*

- *UN military Force consisting of 5,200 troops mandated to "improve security and contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and internally displaced persons."*
- *The establishment of a Chadian community police force, the Detachement Intégré de Sécurité (DIS), to be trained and supported by UN Police in order to ensure security in the immediate vicinity of refugee camps and IDP sites.*
- *The deployment of a MINURCAT civilian component, responsible for building the capacity of Chad's justice system, promoting human rights and supporting local conflict mediation.*

*While the MINURCAT's mandate anticipates an exit in March 2011, the Government of Chad recently notified the United Nations that it does not want to renew the MINURCAT mandate after March 2010. The Government has highlighted the UN Force's slow deployment, uncertain impact and the general change in the context that had originally justified an international military presence.*

*The objective of this paper is to provide analysis of the overall security situation in eastern Chad, focusing specifically on the Protection of Civilians. It outlines the threats posed to civilians,*

*examines the MINURCAT from its arrival to the present, identifies gaps and makes recommendations to overcome them. The paper also highlights the structural factors that underpin instability in Chad: arms proliferation, poor governance and the lack of democracy. The result of this analysis indicates that the MINURCAT, while confronted with serious constraints impeding initial advancements, is progressively improving security. The analysis also indicates that Government of Chad, while bearing the primary responsibility for protecting civilians, does not currently have the capacity to ensure security in a sustainable and comprehensive manner.*

*This document is based on field visits across MINURCAT's major zones of activity in Chad (Bahai, Iriba, Guereda, Farchana, Goz Beida, Koukou Angarana, Abéché, N'djamena) from 16 September 2009 to 24 January 2010. A total of 220 persons were interviewed including: refugees, IDPs, host communities, government officials, international and local humanitarian staff, DIS agents, UN Police, MINURCAT civilian and MINURCAT military staff.*

## 2. Current Security Threats

### Violent Banditry

Chad's fragile justice system and porous border has left populations in a perilous security vacuum dominated by impunity. All civilians, including local villagers, refugees, IDPs, humanitarian and UN staff have been victims of aggressive robberies, physical attacks and intimidation. Victims consistently describe bandits as "janjaweed" or unidentified individuals wearing military uniforms carrying automatic machine guns.<sup>1</sup> The true level of banditry is difficult to assess, especially the impact this has had on women and girls. Social taboos, the lack of reliable information and the sheer size of eastern Chad limits aid workers from knowing the real extent of the problem. Nevertheless, incidents such as those taking place in the Assoungba region in late 2009 where bandits stole livestock and killed 5 villagers and wounding 7 others are indicative of the problem.<sup>2</sup>

**"If the humanitarians don't think it is safe to come here, can they move us somewhere where the humanitarians will help us?" IDP in Arkoum**

Refugees and IDPs are also often threatened by banditry while searching for firewood or tending agricultural fields. Even within camps and sites, security remains precarious due to the infiltration of soldiers and armed men, especially in zones north of Farchana. Armed opposition groups routinely visit the Oure Cassoni refugee camp, both child and forced recruitment have been reported and some humanitarians refer to the refugee camp as a "military base".<sup>3</sup>

Increased banditry has also impacted humanitarian assistance. Aid compounds are routinely looted, humanitarian vehicles carjacked and staff have been beaten and even killed. The kidnapping and ransom demand of two humanitarian workers in July and October has caused humanitarian organisations to reduce their presence in remote areas, like Arkoum, and exposed villages along the border.

## Intercommunal Conflict and Resource Competition

The large-scale intercommunal conflict that caused the displacement of over 180,000 people has diminished significantly since mid-2007, as zones became ethnically homogenous or void of large sedentary communities after the initial IDP movements. However the threat of renewed conflict remains as concentrated refugee and IDP populations outstrip available resources and IDPs try to return to their villages of origin. Numerous incidents have occurred between refugees, IDPs and local farmers and nomads. Locals have complained that refugees' livestock devour community crops and IDPs have even been killed for returning to their villages of origin.<sup>4</sup>



Nomads herd thousands of camels through the resource-poor region of Dar Sila during the yearly migration. Goz Beida

**“Water, land and animals are our way of life. But since the refugees arrived, water levels have dropped and our crops and animals have been stolen. They take our resources and also receive humanitarian assistance. The local population receives nothing, we are suffering.”** *Local government official*

Some humanitarian assistance has also contributed to increasing tensions between communities by focusing aid on IDPs and refugees, and paying insufficient attention to local communities. The livelihood of eastern Chad's population is deeply tied to the land through agriculture and nomadic herding, but chronic poverty, weak productivity and little rain mean sustenance farmers barely grow sufficient crops to feed themselves for even 6 months out of the year.

Locals believe the label of “refugee” or “IDP” is irrelevant after 6 years and that all populations suffer from the same factors: poverty, lack of development, insufficient food and physical insecurity. Even in eastern Chad's largest and most developed city, Abéché, more than 20% of children below the age of five suffer from malnutrition, significantly surpassing UNICEF's emergency threshold levels.<sup>5</sup> To local populations, humanitarian assistance is discriminatory and their perceptions have been ignored by many organisations. For example, the UNHCR is specifically mandated to support refugees, and local populations living around camps receive disproportionately little assistance.<sup>6</sup> In Guereda, locals have gone as far as to threaten publicly to kill refugees if, in addition to receiving assistance, they venture outside of camps and continue to use local resources irresponsibly.<sup>7</sup> In order to control tensions, more support will have to target local communities beyond the immediate vicinity of refugee camps and IDP sites.<sup>8</sup>

## Regional Armed Conflict

The backdrop to banditry and intercommunal violence is the ongoing conflict between Chad, Sudan and their proxy opposition groups. Recent discussions on enhancing joint-border security, aimed solely at controlling Armed Opposition Group (AOG) movements through the use of static monitoring bases, has been showing signs of progress. But discussions on long-term peace have been fragmented and inconsistent. Peace initiatives in Sirte, between the Chadian government and AOGs, and the Dakar and Doha peace talks, between Chad and Sudan, have

achieved few results. While the international community must continue supporting regional peace initiatives, insufficient attention has focused on Chad's domestic crisis. Chad's internal political struggle fuels poverty, impunity and undermines peace. Without equal attention addressing Chad's political environment, the region risks remaining trapped in a cycle of violence.

**"I just want to see my children live with freedom inside their own land, to live like a human – not in a refugee camp."** *Refugee in Goz Amir*

### 3. The International Response to the Humanitarian Crisis

#### EUFOR Transition

EUFOR was a European force, composed of 3,700 troops, that was mandated to provide "area-wide" security and contribute to protecting civilians in danger and facilitate humanitarian assistance until the UN force arrived. As a tool to support IDP returns, results were inconsistent, however it did play an important role in the Assoungha region where 11,800 IDPs returned to their villages of origin.<sup>9</sup> Local populations felt safer and attributed IDP returns to EUFOR's presence. EUFOR demonstrated what limited international forces can accomplish with flexibility, resources and an appropriate Concept of Operations, which prioritised the use of temporary bases, long-range patrols and engagement with local chiefs.<sup>10</sup>

Since UN Security Council Resolution 1778 in September 2007, the EUFOR was identified as transitional in nature, but DPKO and the UN Security Council made insignificant preparations for a likely UN replacement Force. When the transfer to UN Forces occurred in March 2009 it was far from a success.<sup>11</sup> Last minute attempts to recruit soldiers, ensure logistical support and mobilise resources were ineffectual.<sup>12</sup> A flexible, cohesive and resourced EUFOR began transferring out of eastern Chad before the MINURCAT Force could adequately provide the same level of security and meet expectations. The fact that the transfer did not completely fail, can be attributed mostly to the rehatting of EUFOR troops as UN forces and the support EUFOR leadership gave to incoming UN leaders.



EUFOR's communication strategy, aimed at explaining roles, used brochures in French and Arabic. Arkoum

The hurdles involved in rolling out a multinational UN military force in complex environments are not new to the international community. Since the landmark Brahimi Report in 2000, numerous reports have identified the exceptional challenges facing peacekeeping operations. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support should have begun strategic planning, recruiting troops and procuring supplies at least 6 months before the transfer.

But almost one year later, the lack of preparation is evident and vulnerable populations do not understand why the MINURCAT cannot provide the same level of security. EU and UN cooperation needs to reinforce synchronisation, taking into account deployment timeframes and structural differences. The DPKO still needs considerable reform to bridge the gap between ambitious mandates and a politicised system of troop recruitment and supply procurement.<sup>13</sup>

## The MINURCAT II Mission

Working through DPKO, the UN Security Council mandated the MINURCAT II to take over from EUFOR with the aim of “help[ing] create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons, inter alia by contributing to the protection of refugees, displaced persons and civilians in danger, by facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance in eastern Chad [...] and by creating favourable conditions for reconstruction and economic and social development”.

The DPKO was responsible for a preliminary Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) before the MINURCAT transfer in order to assess the threats posed to populations, and to provide guidance on how to protect civilians and what the mission would require. A TAM can also be an opportunity for humanitarian, development and human rights actors to support the DPKO in developing a mission-wide protection of civilian strategy. But the TAM never occurred before the Force was deployed, weakening the mission from the onset.<sup>14</sup>

## The MINURCAT Force

### Deployment

As of mid-February 2010, the MINURCAT Force deployment was around 68%, roughly 3,500 out of 5,200. Less than half of the 18 helicopters pledged to the mission have been supplied, field bases are not completed owing to logistical delays and the composition of new troop contingents does not respect minimum Force Requirements. Contingents vary in levels of professionalism, training, personal equipment and ultimately, their capacity to respond.

### Improved security where there is a MINURCAT presence

Overall, refugees and IDPs support the presence of UN troops and want to see them on a daily basis, near nomadic corridors and agricultural fields. Where the Force has sufficient resources and has prioritised the use of patrols, populations feel safer. Many IDPs and refugees stated that the Force’s presence minimises the risk of renewed large-scale violence, similar to levels that occurred from 2005 to 2007 and “the Force’s departure would be a disaster.”<sup>15</sup> Some IDPs said that without the Force’s presence their chances of returning home will decrease and others stated that attacks outside and inside sites would increase without the UN troops. When asked if national forces could fill the gap if the Force left, IDPs said national forces neither have the capacity nor the interest to protect them and in many cases they are perpetrators of violence against IDPs.<sup>16</sup> Some humanitarians support the UN Force’s presence, but the majority acknowledge that the number of incidents targeting humanitarian staff has progressively decreased since mid-2009.<sup>17</sup> Disappointment has been mainly linked to the Force’s inability to provide consistent patrols and a permanent presence owing to resource deficiencies and slow deployment.

“I am happy the international forces are here [...] if they left us, the humanitarians would probably leave because of insecurity, it would be a disaster.”

## Communication with communities

Basic gaps exist in daily operations that affect the quality and impact of the Force. The mission requires a routine level of engagement with beneficiary populations in order to explain roles, control expectations and receive feedback. To facilitate this, contingents have soldiers with language skills or allocate budgets to hire translators. In the northern sector, ranging from Bahai to Guereda, a contingent of more than 350 soldiers had only one Arabic speaking soldier and no budget to hire local translators, limiting the capacity to communicate with locals.<sup>18</sup>

“ I have seen the MINURCAT Force only a few times, maybe only once this past month [...] but I still feel safer from bandits and rebels. In 2005, before the Force and DIS were here, we used to be attacked directly inside the camp. ”

## Patrols

In order to provide patrols during the rainy season, when roads are impassable, and in an attempt to offset low troop numbers, the Force uses helicopter patrols to insert soldiers into locations for short periods of time. For months though, the use of helicopters was limited because of delays in deployment and certification of landing sites. While more helicopters are now available, the Force is still hampered by landing site certifications and it has received helicopters lacking the capacity to provide emergency night evacuations thus restricting the use of long-range, overnight patrols.<sup>19</sup> And without a consistent ground presence to support air assets, leading many refugee and IDP populations to describe the helicopter visits as “tourist stops”.<sup>20</sup>



Armoured Personnel Carrier used by the MINURCAT to patrols eastern Chad. Bahai

Many patrols are not carried out during high-risk hours and in exposed locations and this is something that will need to change in order for MINURCAT’s patrols to be most effective. Most banditry incidents occur as IDPs or refugees go to agricultural fields or markets before 7am or as they return with crops and goods after 4pm. The killing of two merchants and the wounding of another while returning from a neighbouring village market in the early evening on 3 December 2009 highlights the protection gap.<sup>21</sup> From mid-September until late November 2009, attacks targeting humanitarians occurred around Hadjer Hadid. Vehicles were carjacked, an NGO base was robbed and staff were threatened at gunpoint and beaten. One NGO convoy was even stopped by men armed with rocket-propelled grenades, who then attempted to flee with 3 stolen vehicles and 7 kidnapped staff.<sup>22</sup> Even an armed escort led by the DIS was attacked, causing an exchange of gunfire. As early as October, humanitarians asked the MINURCAT to increase security in the area, but it was not until mid-December that troops were deployed. When asked why MINURCAT was not responding, a UN soldier stated that, “[The] UN Force is busy performing escorts [...] schedules and patrols are coordinated by the mission’s civilian leadership [...] and we have lost the flexibility to meet IDP, refugee and humanitarian needs.”<sup>23</sup>

Apart from the refugee camp of Oure Cassoni, MINURCAT has had minimal if any presence along the border. Border towns such as Adé hosting 16,000 IDPs and Dogdoré hosting 27,000 IDPs, in addition to humanitarian organisations, receive little support. The need for patrols along the border is demonstrated by the unfortunate death of an NGO staff member in Adé in

November 2009, when bandits gunned down his vehicle,<sup>24</sup> and without patrols and presence in border areas, populations along the border will remain at risk. According to a MINURCAT memo, the UN Force is prohibited from patrolling within 30km of the border as of 7 January 2010.<sup>25</sup> This decision is due to pressure from the Government of Chad for MINURCAT not to maintain a presence at the border; however such pressure arguably contravenes the SOFA and the MINURCAT mandate. The Force is effectively constrained from achieving its robust protection mandate, thus leaving thousands at risk.

**“If we weren’t so consumed with escorts, we could be doing more long-range patrols. EUFOR was doing 5-day patrols every week because they didn’t receive escort requests” - MINURCAT Soldier**

When asked how to improve operations, interviewed UN military personnel said they must simply concentrate patrols in high-risk zones, including the border. One officer said, “instead of providing escorts, the MINURCAT Force must establish mobile operating bases (long-range patrols lasting several days) allowing them to be closer to vulnerable populations.”<sup>26</sup> Another soldier noted that too many UN security assets are devoted to towns where existing national security forces are in place. He believed more attention should be placed on encouraging capacity building and pressuring local security forces to fulfil their own responsibilities, so MINURCAT Forces can focus on “area-wide” security.

## The Détachement Intégré de Sécurité (DIS)

The establishment of the Détachement Intégré de Sécurité (DIS) simultaneously addresses local level insecurity while building the capacity of Chad’s own community policing structure. As the UN Force aims to improve security beyond camps and IDPs sites, the DIS is tasked “exclusively [with] maintaining law and order in refugee camps, sites with concentrations of internally displaced persons and key towns in neighbouring areas and to assisting in securing humanitarian activities.”<sup>27</sup>

### Communities feel safer within the camps

Over the past months the DIS, with UN Police support, has significantly improved its operations and conduct. Many refugees and IDPs have appreciated their performance, rapid response and indicate that they feel safer inside camps and sites where the DIS are providing regular patrols. Many refugees are aware of the difficulties confronting the DIS and believe they are doing the best they can, considering the context. While limited in numbers, female DIS agents with gender training are empowering women and girls to report problems and take charge of their lives.

### Security gaps outside of the camps

Refugees and IDPs alike still believe the DIS “cannot prevent insecurity outside of the camps because there are simply not enough DIS relative to the number of persons searching for wood, tending animals or working in fields outside of the camps and sites every day.”<sup>28</sup> Attacks on individuals leaving the relative safety of camps and sites continue to occur when they visit agricultural fields or collect wood.

**“We are scared of the presence of arms [...] we are taking risks, but we are doing our best to protect refugees and IDPs. The Government has to control the level of arms or the situation will not improve.” DIS Agent**

## Contextual challenges facing the DIS – violence and heavily armed bandits

The contextual challenges impacting the DIS' success are banditry, arms proliferation and impunity. DIS agents have been overpowered by armed bandits and are reluctant to take risks, such as patrolling at night. A DIS Captain stressed that, "bandits are heavily armed with Kalashnikovs and rocket propelled grenades."<sup>29</sup> In numerous locations, DIS agents are frightened owing to the high presence of arms and therefore refuse to do night patrols. The arms cache found in the Oure Cassoni refugee camp on 23 December readily shows what the DIS is confronted with: 13 machine guns, 15 rocket propelled grenades and hundreds of rounds of ammunition.<sup>30</sup> Even the relative safety of the DIS compounds is insufficient, as demonstrated in Gaga when a dozen armed men attacked the base with machine guns, wounding two DIS officers. Despite conditions, DIS agents have successfully apprehended hundreds of perpetrators since they deployed. But, due to ineffectual justice and prison structures, many perpetrators are released within days and continue committing crimes with complete impunity.

## Lack of monitoring and evaluation

The main structural gap is the lack of an independent evaluations and monitoring mechanism that can credibly track progress, verify activities and gauge the DIS' capacity to control crime.<sup>31</sup> Existing monitoring is not comprehensive; it relies heavily on the DIS' own reporting, placing emphasis on the number of activities instead of outcomes, such as beneficiaries' sense of security or satisfaction with performance. Focusing on activities without independent verification has led to discrepancies, while some DIS claim to be conducting night patrols and meeting chiefs, interviews with beneficiaries have often provided contradictory accounts. Without evaluations it is difficult to identify ways to improve, such as the refugees' suggestion for DIS joint-night patrols with vigilance committee members that could help agents overcome their reluctance to visit camps at night. Independent evaluations may cause tensions, but the way forward is to ensure that the DIS are truly "community police" and accountable to beneficiaries.

**"They have been attacked, and since the death of a DIS officer [to armed bandits], they have reduced their presence in the camp and have stopped doing night patrols." *Refugee in Goz Amir***

## Resource Challenges

Operationally the DIS is under-resourced with vehicles. Agents are sometimes expected to operate with only one vehicle in camps with over 25,000 refugees. But agents confirm they were initially supplied with more vehicles. The majority of their trucks are completely inoperable because of gross negligence and excessive speed. In Guereda, DIS agents were given 11 vehicles, yet only 4 are presently functional. By comparison, UNHCR has been operating there with 30 vehicles for years, visiting camps every day, and all their vehicles are still in use.



DIS vehicle with damaged suspension system. Bahai

## The need for accountability and oversight

Problems with discrimination and corruption have touched some DIS offices. While agents risk their lives, some are not receiving their salaries. Most DIS agents have been reluctant to speak openly to their superiors or UN Police, nevertheless, in private they have said that certain officers in their hierarchy harass or mark them absent because of their gender, religion or ethnicity.<sup>32</sup> In terms of corruption, material loss and fuel theft have been occurring with inadequate controls. A UN contractor, providing fuel for DIS vehicles, remarked that in one location a DIS agent refuelled the same vehicle three times

within two hours.<sup>33</sup> Wishful thinking and training alone are not sufficient to prevent discrimination and corruption within the DIS. The legitimacy and credibility of the DIS resides in its performance and its exemplary behaviour, CONAFIT and the UN must ensure that a zero tolerance policy is enforced and guarantee that DIS agents have the possibility to report irregularities without fear of persecution.

### **The future of the DIS**

The DIS have made advances, but continued progress and sustainability are far from being assured. Professionalism within the DIS ranks is still inconsistent, and instilling a “community police” culture that is accountable to beneficiaries will take many years. However it is important to note that CNAR, the predecessor to the DIS also faced similar challenges initially, however after some 3-4 years they had become accepted and appreciated by the refugee and humanitarian community.

## **Improving the Protection of Civilians**

Despite operational gaps and contextual challenge, the mutually reinforcing activities of the UN Forces and the DIS are gradually providing an expansive, albeit fragile security umbrella that the Government of Chad could not easily replicate. While they are responding within their current limitations, both forces can improve effectiveness if their tasks are part of a realistic mission-wide strategy for the protection of civilians.

### **Need for a PoC strategy**

As of January 2010 the MINURCAT’s civilian management had yet to develop a well-defined and comprehensive strategy for the protection of civilians, and the UN Security Council’s approval of ill-adapted and unachievable MINURCAT benchmarks and progress indicators has not provided any guidance.<sup>34</sup> The lack of a clear coherent strategy has been apparent due to various incidents. In May 2009, the mission’s management responded to clashes between AOGs and the Chadian Army near Koukou by “relocating” DIS agents and humanitarian staff. However, no measures were taken to protect refugees, IDPs and host communities who remained vulnerable. One refugee described that the MINURCAT landed the helicopter in the camp playground and evacuated the DIS without an explanation. “As the fighting continued, there were no MINURCAT and no DIS,” he said. “They left us all alone.”<sup>35</sup> This incident only highlights the problem when multiple civilian groups are simultaneously facing an imminent threat. Without clear planning that can address the needs of multiple civilian groups, the UN Forces’ interventions are more ad hoc than strategic, creating gaps and leaving persons at risk.

### **Improving security through a different approach to current resources**

Confronted with banditry which targets humanitarians, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) has responded by requiring all MINURCAT and UN Agency staff to use armed escorts.<sup>36</sup> While armed escorts were initially viewed as exceptional, they have become a standard response.<sup>37</sup> By focusing on armed escorts, the MINURCAT has created a *winner-takes-all* security approach aimed at protecting primarily UN staff and certain aid workers, to the detriment of refugees, IDPs and local communities. As escorts are used in high numbers, they are overstressing the UN Force and DIS agents, rendering them ineffectual and seriously damaging the credibility of the MINURCAT.

Armed escorts do not improve the security of refugees or IDPs and may actually endanger humanitarians. Numerous DIS-led armed escorts have come under attack by heavily armed bandits, placing civilian lives at risk. On 20 December near Goz Beida, an exchange of gunfire between bandits and DIS agents wounded one DIS agent and two civilian vehicles received bullet impacts, narrowly missing staff.<sup>38</sup> The reasons for attacks on DIS-led escorts may be multiple. As early as May 15, pamphlets had been distributed, warning that, “all humanitarians being escorted by DIS will be targeted for attack.”<sup>39</sup> One DIS agent stated that bandits have military

experience and, “[...] are not scared of us. They are poor and want to make money by stealing expensive trucks. We get in their way, so of course, there is going to be a gunfight.”<sup>40</sup>

Senior officers within the MINURCAT Force have recommended the use of *preventative deployment* in order to address insecurity. It is a robust, flexible approach that deploys troops to identified high-risk zones. Preventative deployment balances the Force’s limited capacity with the daily needs of all beneficiaries. However it is incompatible when security regulations require the Force and DIS to accommodate continuous escort requests. The recommendation to use preventative deployment has come from diverse levels in the UN Force, yet the mission’s civilian management is not applying this valuable advice.

Providing preventative deployment will also require that incoming troops have *expeditionary capabilities*, understood as having the appropriate training, mindset and resources to go into the field for extended periods of time, using long-range patrols and mobile operational bases. This approach allows the Force to visit insecure agricultural zones, nomadic corridors and villages, like Dogdoré and Adé. The Force must also have information gathering capabilities needed to identify threats and respond credibly.

**“Instead of providing escorts, the MINURCAT Force must establish mobile operating bases (long-range patrols lasting several days), in order to be in closer contact with vulnerable populations.”** *Senior MINURCAT military officer*

### Improving information and analysis

The overall approach the MINURCAT takes towards security and the protection of civilians, including the UN Force and DIS, relies heavily on UNDSS. It is charged with gathering security information and providing analysis to the mission’s civilian leadership and to humanitarians. However the security information provided by UNDSS to humanitarian organisations has been lacking risk-analysis and threat-assessments for all operational zones. It has neither been able to provide creative solutions beyond armed escorts nor provide sufficient data on banditry, especially banditry targeting local communities.

### Sustainability and SSR

Despite the lack of strategic vision guiding civilian management, the Force and the DIS are gradually showing signs of improvement and security in some areas is improving. But the risk that secured areas will relapse into violence in the long-term remains.<sup>41</sup> The Force and the DIS are only temporary measures filling a security vacuum, and the only way to improve security durably in eastern Chad is for national security actors to commit genuinely to reform and capacity-building programmes.

The MINURCAT and UN Security Council must place pressure on the Government of Chad to develop a transparent and comprehensive security strategy for eastern Chad that addresses the issues of banditry, arms proliferation and impunity for all civilians. The strategy should specify how national and local security forces will be reinforced and also be held accountable. In the meantime, the UNDSS should gather data on local security structures and identify where and how the MINURCAT can reinforce them with resources or training, such as risk management and human rights. For example, traditional chiefs routinely develop extensive civilian security networks using satellite phones and strong inter-village relations. When armed men are sighted, village chiefs contact each other and inform populations of possible danger. Inside camps and sites, vigilance committees perform foot patrols and organise groups to gather firewood, minimising exposure. Directly supporting local actors can be cost-effective and potentially improve localised security, but support will also require strict monitoring to prevent abuse.

**“To resolve impunity and fight banditry, the UN’s role must be part of a broader Government-led security strategy for the East.”** *IDP in Aradip*

## Ending the Culture of Impunity

In response to Chad’s faltering justice sector, the MINURCAT’s substantive units (Rule of Law, Gender and Human Rights) are aiming to bolster Chad’s weak judicial and penal sectors, and end impunity.

### Rule of law activities

The Rule of Law unit’s principle programme provides training to *sous-prefets*, local civil servants representing the executive branch, who assume judicial powers when qualified judges are absent and while national justice reform remains stalled.<sup>42</sup> But reinforcing the overlap of executive and judicial powers is a risky approach.<sup>43</sup> IDPs and refugees already face numerous problems with abusive *sous-prefets*, who combine personal pursuits with official duties. One refugee stated that the *sous-prefet* threatened traditional chiefs and declared that they have no authority. Other refugees added, “the *sous-prefet* makes us pay for every case he judges” and other said many are officers in the military.<sup>44</sup> Even when qualified judges have visited the East, some *sous-prefets* refuse to relinquish judicial authority, as commented by local humanitarian staff. The majority of people interviewed prefer traditional justice and felt traditional chiefs should be supported and trained until qualified judges arrive.

**“There used to be professional judges in the East, but they all left for various reasons, including threats. Training *sous-prefets* will not resolve the underlying problems. We need real judges and real justice.”**

*Local human rights organisation*

Instead of pursuing this high-risk programme, the MINURCAT should focus on the fundamental gaps: (1) the general population’s lack of knowledge of human rights, civil rights and specific gender rights<sup>45</sup>; (2) the lack of genuine political will to implement existing judicial reform programmes<sup>46</sup> and; (3) addressing the reasons why previous judges in eastern Chad fled their posts, such as intimidation and death threats.<sup>47</sup> These fundamental gaps need to be addressed before the withdrawal of the MINURCAT in order to ensure that advances are sustainable.

### The need for comprehensive SSR

Substantial improvement in justice will only occur if it is understood as part of a holistic and country-wide Security Sector Reform (SSR) strategy led by the Government with international support. It must touch all the institutions that promote security and rule of law, and include depolitization, improving policing and democratic, civilian oversight over the armed forces, especially the Chadian Army.

Accountability is a vital component of any SSR. Chadian soldiers meant to be protecting civilians have perpetrated repeated violations. According to UN reports soldiers have abused and attacked refugees, IDPs, host populations, DIS agents, UN staff and humanitarians.<sup>48</sup> Armed Chadian soldiers even boarded a UN military helicopter and coerced the pilot to fly them to Abéché where UN troops present in the helicopter were later interrogated at a Chadian military base.<sup>49</sup> Various sources also confirmed that soldiers entered Abéché’s courthouse and intimidated staff by firing shots into the air in mid-January 2010.

**“A colonel in the Army, of Zagawa ethnicity, was killed as he tried to kidnap a young girl from her family in a refugee camp. He tried to forcibly take her for marriage, as is customary in his ethnic group, against her family’s wishes.”**

*MINURCAT Security Report, 24 November 2009*

Comprehensive SSR may span 15-20 years, but spending close to \$400 million on humanitarian assistance and \$700 million on the MINURCAT without SSR is short-sighted. The UN Security Council has stated that SSR is, “critical to the consolidation of peace and stability, promoting poverty reduction, rule of law and good governance - and preventing countries from relapsing into conflict”.<sup>50</sup> If the international community is serious about helping the situation improve in eastern Chad, it must show sincere resolve and pressure the government to commit to SSR or severe insecurity will return immediately after the MINURCAT’s departure. It is therefore important that serious progress in SSR take place before MINURCAT’s withdrawal.

**“We have to be under the protection of an international force, because the Chadian army is a problem. Believe me, if the army is around, by night time they will be inside the camp. We are afraid of them. ”**

*Refugee Chief*

## Creating Local Peace through Intercommunal Dialogue



In order to decrease the level of violence surrounding intercommunal tensions and promote reconciliation, the MINURCAT’s Political and Civilian Affairs (POLCA) unit has been mandated to, “support the initiatives of national and local authorities in Chad to resolve local tensions.” This however is incredibly challenging and numerous questions highlight the potentially irreconcilable role that a short-term mission is playing while attempting to provide leadership for long-term, locally specific peace-building. This is not to discredit the need to support intercommunal dialogue, it only emphasizes the need to pay special attention to the question of to whom support is offered, and how. Focusing on conflict resolution training, especially the role of women in mediation may be the most durable and risk-free alternative.

Impunity and banditry has meant traditional leaders must provide security for their own communities. Arkoum

### QIPS

The MINURCAT’s use of Quick Impact Project (QIP) funding to support dialogue activities needs to be carefully evaluated in order to ensure funding supports longer term dialogue objectives.. Dialogue is a long-term, process-orientated activity that is susceptible to failure if injected with funds aimed at achieving a “quick impact” and without dedicated pre- and post-monitoring and evaluations.

## Addressing root causes

More importantly, supporting individual dialogue events will only achieve limited results if ethnic discrimination and political favouritism are not addressed. As far back as 1995, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination cautioned “the ethnic aspect of human rights violations and the **predominant influence of certain ethnic minorities** close to the State within the administration and the army” in Chad, but the Government has yet to improve the situation or address the problem publicly.<sup>51</sup> IDPs, local community members and even local government officials repeatedly state that dialogue, in any form, will not succeed if certain ethnic groups continue to believe they are above the law, above communal needs and above peace because of their political connections. Specific recommendations are difficult to identify, but creative ways of addressing ethnic discrimination and ethnic impunity do exist and need to be firmly pursued. Reinforced civic education programmes, the creation of public forums on discrimination and national identity, informational radio programming and supporting transparent elections are just a few options.

“Most groups can work together through intercommunal dialogue, the problem is that certain ethnic groups abuse their political power and have guns.”

*Local government official*

## 4. Protecting civilians in the longer terms

The populations in eastern Chad will continue to remain vulnerable to violence in the long-term if parallel and coordinated efforts by the Government of Chad and other partners do not address structural factors underpinning instability: arms proliferation, poor governance and a lack of democracy.

### Proliferation of Arms

Chad is one of the most heavily armed countries in Sahelian Africa. One study concluded that in the capital of Chad, N’jamena there are on average 12 gun-related incidents per day, and it is estimated that the ratio of small arms to persons is eight to one.<sup>52</sup> The presence of arms, combined with excessive poverty (62% of population is living below the poverty line) has caused banditry to turn into an economic livelihood strategy.<sup>53</sup>

Assault rifles, such as the AK47, are readily available through the black market and the unregulated sale of military uniforms complicates the situation.<sup>54</sup> “Unidentified armed individuals in military attire” is a recurrent description of perpetrators to violations ranging from theft to kidnapping, and even murder.<sup>55</sup> This makes the identification of assailants difficult and causes many victims to forego justice.

The presence of arms is a serious obstacle to stability and achieving the MINURCAT’s progress indicators, notably its aim to declare 10 refugee camps/IDP sites weapons-free. Sizeable weapons



A DIS agent with an AK-47 assault rifle. Dar Sila

seizures will continue to occur if persons can easily replenish weapons. One local protection officer stated that, “as long as the local population in return zones remains armed, IDPs will not return.”<sup>56</sup>

**“If you visit five houses, you will find five guns. The people in Chad are armed and remain ready for war.”** *Local from Guereda*

Arms originating from Chad also undercut regional peace and have been found in Darfur, bypassing UN arms embargos and jeopardizing the safety of aid workers. In 2009 alone, 7 humanitarian staff and 8 UNAMID staff, including armed peacekeepers were killed.<sup>57</sup>

The Government has taken limited initiatives to control arms through sporadic searches. However, forced disarmament is problematic and without a systematic approach that examines and addresses the reasons why civilians are armed, initiatives alone will not resolve the situation.

## Poor Governance and Corruption

The MINURCAT is aiming to transfer protection of civilian activities progressively, such as financial management of the DIS and justice support programmes, to the government. But this risks failure if parallel measures to fight corruption are not staunchly pursued. Corruption and poor governance are directly linked to instability; they undermine state capacity and legitimacy, exacerbate poverty and inflame grievances linked to armed conflict.<sup>58</sup>

As the United Nations undertakes the temporary responsibility for securing eastern Chad, the government continues to receive oil export revenues, exceeding \$4.5 billion since 2004. Unfortunately the money is neither helping the government prepare to assume its duties nor bolstering development. World Bank Good Governance indicators show that from 1996 to 2008, Chad’s track record on accountability, effectiveness, rule of law and corruption have significantly worsened<sup>59</sup> Comparing globally; Transparency International rates Chad the 5<sup>th</sup> most corrupt country in the world.<sup>60</sup>

**“I don’t know why the international community attempts to camouflage the situation by focusing only on humanitarian assistance, instead of trying to change the real problems in Chad.”** *Local humanitarian staff from Guereda*

Chadian civil society has stated that the biggest obstacle to reform is the lack of political will. If international financial donors continue to provide hundreds of millions in assistance but do not monitor and sanction, there is little impetus for improvement. The results of a national survey note the problem, 64% of the interviewed persons think the government has adequate anti-corruption legislation but only 11% think this legislation is actually applied.<sup>61</sup> The population has lost confidence in the government’s capacity to follow through on its commitments.

National strategies are in place to combat corruption and ensure good governance.<sup>62</sup> The solutions already exist; it is time to use them. A two-fold response is needed: engender the domestic political will and hold international financial donors accountable to aid efficiency rhetoric.<sup>63</sup> For example, the French Development Agency and the EC, via the European Development Fund, continue to provide millions of euros to address governance and corruption with insufficient monitoring and political courage, consequently there have been insignificant results. The EC’s internal evaluation from 1996 to 2008 highlights the weak impact its programmes have had on governance.<sup>64</sup> Yet every year, regardless of results, the money keeps

coming.<sup>65</sup> Considering that the MINURCAT's long-term success is dependent on transferring responsibility to a state that is effectively capable of governing, it is in the missions' and the UN Security Councils' own interest to pressure Chad's domestic institutions to implement reforms and, equally, major financial donors to adhere to their principles.

**“The peace process needs to be discussed openly. We need socialisation campaigns to educate the people on Chad’s problems and learn ways to be part of the solution.”**

## Going Beyond Elections - Political Deadlock and Armed Conflict

The response to Chad's humanitarian crisis must be firmly grounded in a political solution to the country's internal political deadlock and ending armed conflict. UNDP indicators rank Chad as the 8<sup>th</sup> least developed country in the world, explaining why 36% of the population is not expected to survive to the age of 40.<sup>66</sup> Armed conflict causes an average annual loss of at least 15% of GDP. The loss is incurred through direct military expenditures, and more indirectly through lost livelihoods and the immeasurable loss of social wellbeing.<sup>67</sup> The Government is not in a position to channel revenues disproportionately to support military campaigns instead of desperately needed development in the East (see table). The solution for ending civilian suffering must be based on a comprehensive political approach.

### Percent (%) of total budget officially allocated to Government Ministries<sup>68</sup>

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Education	15.4	14.6	14.1	15.7	15.9	16.0
Health	5.6	5.6	6.7	7.0	7.1	7.2
Social and Cultural Development	2.7	3.8	3.0	3.2	3.2	3.2
<b>Military and Defence</b>	<b>16.3</b>	<b>13.1</b>	<b>14.8</b>	<b>14.3</b>	<b>14.2</b>	<b>14.1</b>

Responding to Chad's internal conflict, the international community has placed unwarranted hopes on the electoral process defined within the EU-supported 13 August Agreements. Elections alone will not realistically improve political instability, especially considering that a constitutional change in 2005 allows for unlimited presidential terms in Chad. Focusing short-sightedly on elections misses the fact that political pluralism is extremely weak and it is highly probable that the present administration will remain in power. The political arena is burdened with immense hurdles to opposition parties, including intimidation, imprisonment and even disappearance.<sup>69</sup>

**“The problem is neither with the DIS nor with the MINURCAT. The problem is with the Chadian population, we need a national dialogue to address our own problems.”**

Ideally, a more holistic approach to overcoming Chad's internal political deadlock will be developed with concerted participation by Chadian civil society and political opposition leaders. But until then, if the international community continues single-mindedly to proclaim the 13 August Accords as the solution, they should at least not marginalise Chapter 4 of the Accords. The chapter ensures a democratic environment, such as depolitization and demilitarization of the administration, public participation in the political process and press freedoms. Until now, international stakeholders, such as the Governments of France, the United States and Germany,

have narrowly defined the Accords around the technical voting component, giving the impression that they have not even taken the time to read the text of the agreement fully. The German Government has even gone as far as posting that the Accords have already “largely achieved [their] objectives” on the German Foreign Office’s website.<sup>70</sup> The Government of Chad, with the support of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, has also simplified the text, referring only to the main election components in its revised National Poverty Reduction Strategy and not developing an action plan to meet the objectives of Chapter 4.<sup>71</sup> If elections are meant to bring about true and sustainable improvement, they must be done in conjunction with **ALL** of the conditions stipulated in the Accords. International stakeholders must not reduce democratic success, or even progress, to technical voting procedures.

**“The International Community is out of touch with the people’s need and urgency for a political peace, a political solution.”** *Local from Koukou Angarana*

## 5. Conclusions

While major intercommunal violence has diminished, eastern Chad continues to remain in a precarious situation with over 250,000 refugees, 170,000 IDPs and almost a million impoverished locals vying for scarce resources. The Government of Chad has not put into practice systematic measures to improve the situation and tensions continue to build between populations, while the breakdown of law-and-order means impunity and banditry prevails. The MINURCAT is facing enormous contextual challenges and its capacity has been hampered for numerous reasons, but civilian populations and some humanitarians feel safer with the mission's presence because no other reliable alternative exists. The MINURCAT's presence remains important and a withdrawal to the Government of Chad must be gradual and linked to advancements in tackling the factors that underlie insecurity and impunity. Most importantly, the Government must ensure that it is capable of ensuring the protection of civilians.

Despite a difficult start, the *Détachement Intègre de Sécurité* is progressively showing signs of improvement with the daily support of UN Police; refugees and IDPs report that they feel safer. The MINURCAT Force is scheduled to reach full deployment later this year and if it can commit itself to preventive deployment instead of focusing on escorts, it has the potential to improve security markedly in localised high-risk zones, deter large-scale organised violence from recurring and support an environment where humanitarians may provide assistance to all populations in need.

In the short-term, the MINURCAT must ensure that its activities reinforce and complement existing justice, human rights and security programmes throughout the rest of the country. An isolated MINURCAT in the East will only produce short-lived and costly interventions. A competent and dynamic Humanitarian Coordinator can play an important role in developing a strategic and long-term vision for the MINURCAT.<sup>72</sup> Until now however, the various assistance programmes in Chad are suffering from fragmentation and valuable opportunities for strategic partnership are being lost, furthermore, coordination will have to go far beyond the United Nations Development Programme and the UN Country Team. Coordination will have to find ways to place the MINURCAT within a broader country-wide framework of activities supported by all key financial donors, such as the European Union, France, Germany, Switzerland and the United States, and institutional agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

But it is important to clarify expectations on what can and cannot be achieved by the MINURCAT alone, especially in terms of the reliance on UN Forces and the DIS to ensure the protection of all civilians. Many factors contributing to insecurity and chronic underdevelopment in eastern Chad have prevailed for decades with almost zero international attention. The MINURCAT, if properly managed and resourced can significantly improve localised, temporary stability and create a foundation that the Government of Chad can subsequently build upon in the East. The Government for its part must immediately revive existing reform programmes regarding governance, justice and security in order to ensure it can provide security for civilians and prevent the MINURCAT's advancements from being immediately lost upon the mission's exit.

The MINURCAT is not the panacea for Chad's structural problems and will not resolve the overall level of insecurity and impunity without genuine national and international support. The UN has declared that "responsibility to protect must also entail the responsibility to do it right," with reference to peacekeeping missions. But the responsibility "to do it right" equally applies to the Government of Chad. Before the MINURCAT withdraws from Chad, the Government must demonstrate genuine efforts to undertake comprehensive measures to protect civilian populations, including SSR reform and the provision of accountable security mechanisms throughout eastern Chad. Without these efforts, and in particular if MINURCAT is required to leave quickly, civilians in eastern Chad will be even more at risk than before.

## **Recommendations:**

### **To the Government of Chad**

- Begin preparations for the exit of MINURCAT, aiming to achieve a controlled, phased exit. Including the development of a credible physical security strategy that meets the particular needs of civilian populations, including refugees, IDPs and aid workers.
- Reinforce and implement existing security sector reform (including armed forces, penal and justice sector reform) programmes on a national level, in order to counter impunity and sustain advances achieved by the MINURCAT. Progress must be measured by tangible indicators and verifiable results.
- With the assistance of the international community, the Government must begin to develop strategic long term plans to assume complete control of the DIS. The plans must indicate realistic, phased timelines and include: financial management, resource and munitions management and monitoring mechanisms. Plans should also indicate how DIS agents will eventually be re-integrated into existing national security forces.

### **To the UN Security Council**

- Ensure that the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is respected and the UN Forces have the freedom of movement and access as deemed necessary to fulfil their mandate. UN Forces should not be prevented from providing patrols within 30km of the Chad-Sudan border.
- Ensure that the eventual exit of the MINURCAT is carried out in a controlled, phased manner that minimises the risk of severe protection gaps.
- Apply pressure on the Government of Chad to implement holistic security sector reform, and specifically, deal with the impunity afforded to certain ethnic groups.
- Revise the MINURCAT's benchmarks and indicators in order to ensure they are realistically achievable and that the mission is appropriately resourced for meeting its objectives.

### **To the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) in eastern Chad**

Through a consultative process, lead the development a mission-wide Protection of Civilians security strategy, taking into consideration appropriate response to both low-level banditry and rapid onset crisis, with present and anticipated resources levels.

- Re-evaluate the use of armed escorts and identify other risk mitigation tactics that balance with the security needs of refugees, IDPs and humanitarians. This single factor is significantly hindering the success of both the DIS and UN Forces by overstressing assets.
- Perform a comprehensive field assessment that evaluates all local, including traditional, security structures – identifying points of interaction and/or support through training or resources.
  - MINURCAT mandate and activities
  - Training: basic security management, conflict mediation, radio communications, and human rights and gender/SGBV
  - Resources: satellite phones, handset and base radios
- Ensure any support to local actors includes a monitoring and evaluations component in order to track progress, promote transparency and identify gaps.

- Reinforce communications between local actors in order to identify high-risk zones that require increased UN Force presence.
- Ensure that UNDSS staff are appropriately trained and resourced in order to accomplish above tasks.

#### **To the MINURCAT Civilian Leadership and Civilian Units**

- Substantive units (Rule of Law, Gender and Human Rights) must be given appropriate financial resources and develop comprehensive programme proposals including dedicated monitoring and evaluations, especially for all Quick Impact Projects.
- The potential negative impact or threat to community dynamics (between sedentary locals, nomads, IDPs and refugees) in the short and long-term must be determined before the use of Quick Impact Projects.
- Establish an Outreach Unit and Communications strategy, including the use of interactive or live radio programming with question/response formatting. Messaging should address:
  - MINURCAT mandate and activities
  - The role and responsibilities of the DIS
  - The roles of and differences between existing security forces in the East (DIS, MINURCAT Forces, Gendarmerie, Garde Nomade, Police and ANT)
  - Address, inform and control expectations
  - Provide a forum to discuss issues such as security, community dialogue, justice, human rights, elections and good governance.
- Prioritise the recommendations and strategy identified by UN Force leadership and as described within the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) that ensure the UN Force's activities guarantee the protection of civilians and area-wide security (i.e. the use of long-range patrols, force projection, mobile operation bases, expedition capabilities, etc).

#### **To the MINURCAT Forces**

- CIMIC officers should develop outreach strategies, including radio programming, aimed at all beneficiary and non-beneficiary populations in the East.
- Ensure contingents have sufficient troops or translators skilled in Arabic, French and, if necessary, local dialects.
- Adhere to the established Concept of Operations (CONOPS), prioritising preventive deployment and flexibility.
- Increase the number of long-range patrols and support helicopter patrols with an increased ground presence in high-risk zones. Do not focus on the provision of armed escorts.

#### **To the Détachement Integre de Sécurité (DIS) and UN Police Force:**

- Reinforce community policing evaluation methodology, including independent and impartial monitoring programmes that rely on quantitative and qualitative feedback from beneficiaries. Evaluations should aim to track progress, identify strengths/weaknesses and document lessons learned.
- Ensure that the selection and recruitment process is transparent and based on objective qualifications.
- Systematically perform joint foot patrols and night patrols with members of refugee or IDP vigilance committees.

- Make a special effort to tackle ethnic, gender and religious discrimination and corruption. Ensure that perpetrators are properly sanctioned. Create an internal oversight system which ensures that whistleblowers can inform DIS and UN Police hierarchy without fear of persecution.
- Increase the level of female DIS agents as candidates become available and provide culturally-contextually specific gender/SGBV training.
- Ensure that female IDPs and refugees can meet DIS agents without having to receive prior consent from traditional chiefs or husbands by reinforcing existing female DIS agents and ensuring that they systematically engage with women's committees and female leaders.

#### **To the Department of Peacekeeping Missions (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS)**

- Promote Technical Assessment Missions (TAM), which include humanitarian and development experts, in addition to political and military advisors. Deploy TAMs with sufficient time to assess the situation thoroughly, consult partners and visit all major zones of operation.
- In addition to TTC verification mechanisms, develop an independent pre-deployment verification mechanism which ensures that all incoming troops meet Force Requirements (FRs) and can adhere to the CONOPS, i.e. adequate training, personal equipment and professionalism.
- Ensure that essential enablers, such as helicopters adapted for night use are rapidly deployed or provide modification kits so that existing helicopters can be upgraded.

#### **To the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC)**

- Working closely with the SRSG, UNCT, national authorities and bilateral donors, help guide the mission's activities within the framework of national development strategies, such as the National Strategy for Good Governance and National Poverty Reduction Plan, ensuring that the MINURCAT's short term activities reinforce and complement longer-term national objectives.

#### **To UN Agencies and NGOs**

- Dedicate sufficient resources (staff and financial) to community support programmes, specifically to Chief, Vigilance and Women's Committees. Special attention must be paid to ensuring that committees remain motivated.

#### **To the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Bilateral/Regional Donors**

- Prioritise funding for monitoring and evaluations in all assistance programmes.
- Develop civic education and human rights mobile clinics and outreach aimed at local communities: use existing models, such as APLFT's Judiciary Mobile Clinics and InformAction Project that educates youth on democracy, development and governance.
- Increase financial support for programmes aimed at local communities beyond the immediate vicinity of refugee camps and IDP sites.

#### **To the Governments of France, the United States and China**

- Stop providing technical military assistance to the Chadian Armed Forces, if existing SSR activities are not genuinely implemented.

## To the EU

- Rather than pushing for elections to happen at any cost and narrowly defining the Aug 13th Accords around the technical voting component , EU (both MS and EC), which has invested much in the stabilization of Chad through the deployment of Eufor and as main broker / supporter of the August 13th agreements should develop an action plan to meet the objectives of chapter 4 and use all its leverage to ensure that tangible progress under chap 4 of Aug 13th agreements are achieved, especially relating to depolitization and demilitarization of the administration, public participation in the political process and press freedoms. If elections are meant to bring about true and sustainable improvement, they must be done in conjunction with ALL of the conditions stipulated in the Accords. International stakeholders must not reduce democratic success, or even progress, to technical voting procedures.

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## Interesting sites and documents

UN Human Development Report 1994  
<http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1994/en>

Human Security Now  
<http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/>

Advisory Board on Human Security  
<http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/abhs/documents.html>

Centre for Human Security  
<http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/chs.htm>

Human Security Network  
<http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/menu-e.php>

Institute for Human Security  
<http://fletcher.tufts.edu/humansecurity>

Human Security Report  
<http://www.humansecurityreport.info/>

## Notes

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1 List non exhaustive and only indicative of security incidents caused "individuals in military attire." Mentioned in MINURCAT BRQ security reports on dates: 17.11.2009; 20.11.2009; 27.11.2009; 02.12.2009; 03.12.2009; 04.12.2009; 16.12.2009

2 BRQ on 23 November 2009

3 Interview with DIS agent. He stated that the DIS is trying its best to reduce the number of armed soldiers and rebels from entering the camp, but the DIS is very limited in its capacity to enforce the demilitarisation of the camp. The DIS has even gone so far as to applying pressure (threat) on the families of soldiers or rebels entering the camp in order to force them to at least disarm and deposit their weapons at the DIS office before entering the camp.

4 BRQ on 23 September, locals complain that refugees allow their livestock to graze on local communities' crops; BRQ on 20 October, two IDP from Gassiré were killed as they returned to their village of origin in Tiessou.

5 Analyse Socio-économique d'eau et d'assainissement sur la ville d'Abéché. Nanthilde Kamara and David Michaud. Action Contre la Faim. July 2009. pp 36

6 UNCHR currently devotes 5% of their financial allocation to host community projects, but this is insufficient to offset the gap that has been developing between populations.

7 BRQ on 20 October 2009: A delegation from the local villages around the refugee camp accused refugees of theft, illegal commerce and abusive exploitation of natural resources. The delegation stated that local populations are threatening to kill refugees that go farther than five kilometres outside of camps.

8. The development of a strategic vision is hampered because refugee working group meetings are separated from IDP cluster group meetings (Protection, Water/Sanitation, Food Security). For example, the impact of the Protection Cluster Group is undermined when refugee issues are separated from the protection context, even though refugees themselves are part of the protection problem, i.e. create tensions due to resource depletion, camps may attract banditry.

9 OCHA 2008 Report. See : IDPs in eastern Chad: is it time to go back home? Oxfam International, Action contre la Faim, Care, Cordaid Report. 2009

10 Concept of Operations (CONOPS) is an explanation of how a mission will apply its military resources to achieve its objectives as derived from the Security Council mandate. It lays out the basic force structure, describes the role that the military component will play in the mission strategy.

11 EU Council, GAERC conclusions on EU - UN cooperation concluded that the transfer from EUFOR to MINURCAT in March 2009 was a successful operation.

12 The recruitment of soldiers, Force Generation, began in January 2009 with the UNSC resolution 1861. Basic documents such as the UN Force Concept of Operations and Concept of Deployment were issued only in February, one month before the transfer was to occur.

13 Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations is the most comprehensive and explicit document to date that highlights gaps and identifies the way forward. It avoids principled recommendations, identifying instead practical recommendations based on case studies.

14 Confidential UN source

15 Interview with IDPs, 22 September 2009.

16 Interviews with IDPs, 21-22 January 2010.

17 Trend analysis of incidents on international humanitarian and UN staff provided by Committee de Coordination pour les ONGs (CCO). An NGO supported and ECHO-financed post that supports the coordination of NGO members in eastern Chad.

18 Generally, the number of IDPs that speak French is limited to chiefs. The majority of IDPs and refugees speak Arabic or local languages.

- 19 According to UN regulations, helicopters can only land in designated day- and night-certified sites that must be renewed every 8 weeks. This places enormous demands on already limited personnel and is logistically impossible in an area of operations as large as Great Britain.
- 20 Interviews with IDPs and local humanitarian staff, 23 September 2009 and 14-15 October 2009.
- 21 BRQ 3 December 2009.
- 22 BRQ 21 October 2009: After stopping vehicles they attempted to flee the scene with 7 kidnapped staff before the vehicle rolled over, and bandits fled on foot leaving wounded staff.
- 23 Interview with MINURCAT Solider, 7 October 2009.
- 24 BRQ 11 November 2009: one staff was killed and two other staff escaped unharmed. The bandits proceeded to fire at the vehicle until their ammunition was exhausted.
- 25 This memo was provided to the researcher from an anonymous source within the UN.
- 26 Numerous MINURCAT soldiers were interviewed between September 2009 – January 2010. All soldiers indicated that apart from low troop levels - the demand for armed escorts was preventing them from focusing activities on providing broader security measures.
- 27 UNSC Resolution 1861
- 28 Interview with refugee, 1 October 2009.
- 29 Interview with DIS agent, 23 September 2009
- 30 BRQ on 23 December 2009 and other sources. The BRQ only mentions a portion of the actual weapons cache discovered. Interviews with humanitarian staff and photos presented to the researcher, indicate the seizure was significantly greater than stated in reports. UNHCR and other NGOs working in Oure Cassoni have in general not commented on the persistent circulation of arms or the possibility that refugee support in the camp may actually be helping/sustaining armed opposition groups by providing a food, water and shelter.
- 31 See Community Policing : Evaluation Programs. DPKO. David Bayley. May 2005
- 32 DIS agents in three different locations have mentioned the same problem. In some cases, UN Police are aware but they have shown little capacity to change the situation, responding that this is "an internal DIS issue."
- 33 Interview with a UN fuel contractor. He reported that the same DIS agent refuelled his vehicle repeatedly within a span of two hours and odometer readings indicated the vehicle had travelled 1.6 km.
- 34 Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad. S/2009/359. 15 July 2009
- 35 Interviews with refugees, local humanitarian staff and DIS agents in September 2009 confirm that evacuations took place with insufficient explanation to refugees and IDPs. DIS commanders stated they were ordered to evacuate and had no choice. One humanitarian staff stated that this incident profoundly impacted the perceptions of refugees towards the MINURCAT.
- 36 NGOs using UN-agency loaned vehicles have been pressured to use escorts. In one case, an NGO was asked to repay the value of a carjacked vehicle to the loaning UN-agency because it had not used an armed escort.
- 37 Senior DPKO members visiting Chad from 2 - 13 June 2009 repeatedly stated during their visit that the DIS were not mandated to provide escorts and they were only to be used exceptionally. However, to date, the provision of escorts is the main activity for DIS agents.
- 38 UN OCHA Flash Report, 21 December 2009
- 39 BRQ 19 May 2009 : " Des informations à confirmer indiquent qu'un tract aurait été lancé à Farchana, mentionnant que Tout humanitaire qui sera escorté par le DIS, fera l'objet d'une attaque."
- 40 Interview with DIS agents, 15-16 December
- 41 The route between Goz Beida and Koukou Angarana had been marked as relatively secure from approximately June until November. The zone had even been used as a marker of success for the MINURCAT. However, starting in late November repeated attacks against armed escorts and unarmed convoys have occurred.
- 42 In conjunction with UNDP and with the financial support from the Government of Germany. The programme cost approximately \$330,000 for the training, a majority of the money going to pay per diems of government participants (approximately US \$67 per day/person). As of

December 2009, no funds had yet been dedicated to support monitoring and evaluations of the programme.

**43** Including the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary.

**44** Interview with refugee chiefs, 13 October 2009

**45** The Association pour la Liberté Fondamentale Tchadienne (APLFT) provides judicial mobile clinics yet their activities are limited to refugees and IDPs, leaving almost one million local inhabitants without support. Activities should fill the education gap by supporting human rights and judicial outreach clinics that target the general population, including nomadic herders and traditional chiefs. Tailoring programmes specific to the needs of women must also be included in all initiatives. The APLFT's and EC/Cordaid's InformAction's programmes are a creative initiatives that should be replicated beyond Abéché.

**46** The 10th European Development Fund for Chad has earmarked €99 [¿solo €99?] as part of its Good Governance programme that includes justice reform through the PROREJ sub-project. The French Development Agency also contributes approximately €700,000 to the PROREJ project, in addition to other programmes. The GoC has also developed the Etats Généraux de la Justice in 2003. This key document identifies the crucial problems within the justice sector and outlines the way forward. But almost 7 years later, few improvements have been made and justice reform is falling behind.

**47** BRQ 13 August 2009 : Judge in Abéché was attacked in his office and received a knife wound ; BRQ 25 August 2009 : Judge in Iriba received a death threat due to case he was hearing.

**48** List non exhaustive and only indicative of security incidents caused directly by Chadian Armed Forces (ANT). The ANT is specifically referred to on BRQ security report dates: 23.01.2009; 24.01.2009; 31.03.2009; 21.08.2009; 23.10.2009; 30.10.2009; 16.11.2009; 24.11.2009

**49** Confidential source within the United Nations – additionally, the Chadian Army had attempted to “apprehend” UN helicopters on two prior occasions without success, but no resolute diplomatic engagement with the GoC by the MINURCAT ensued.

**50** A Beginner's Guide to Security Sector Reform. Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform. December 2007. Cited from the UN Security Council on 20 February 2007.

**51** Situation of Human Rights in Chad. Monica Pinto. United Nations Commission on Human Rights. E/CN.4/2005/121. 27 January 2005

**52** Armed Conflict and Disarmament: Selected African Studies. Nelson Alasula. ISS Monograph Series N°129, March 2007

**53** Speech given by the Governor of Dar Sila to a visiting EU delegation, wherein he says that poverty is the pivotal reason explaining armed banditry targeting humanitarian staff.

**54** Interview with local resident, 8 October 2009 . In Iriba's market AK47s are sold for 135,000 CFA (200 €)

**55** See endnote #1

**56** Interview with local protection officer working in the Assoungaha, 14 October 2009.

**57** Aid workers and UNAMID staff killed in Darfur: 11 (2007); 13 (2008); 10 (2009/Jan-August). Vehicle hijackings between 2008 - 2009 in excess of 372, assaults on compounds/premises in excess of 318 and 11 humanitarian staff kidnapped.

**58** ICG, numerous World Bank and academic studies have shown the direct correlation between failed state institutions and the repeated descent into armed conflict in various countries despite considerable humanitarian assistance and electoral funding - Escaping the Conflict Trap: Promoting Good Governance in the Congo. International Crisis Group. Africa Report N°114, 20 July 2009

**59** Governance Matters 2009: Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996-2008. See: <http://info.worldbank.org/>

**60** Transparency International world ranking places Chad at 175/180 (2009) on corruption.

**61** Plan Stratégique de lutte contre la corruption au Thad. Centre d'Études et de Recherche pour la Dynamique de Organisations. November 2009

**62** The Government of Chad has developed two national strategies incorporating good governance, justice reform and anti-corruption programmes: The National Poverty Reduction

Strategy and the National Strategy for Good Governance. However, lack of implementation and transparency are affecting both.

**63** Most major international bilateral and regional donors are signatories to the Paris Declaration on aid efficiency. The EC in particular is a signatory but does not provide the EC delegation in Chad with sufficient resources nor the political backing to pressure the Government of Chad to be held accountable for EU money.

**64** Evaluation de la coopération de la Commission européenne avec la République du Tchad. Consortium (ECO Consult – AGE – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG). March 2009. vol. 1

**65** The EU's own Commission Staff Working Paper, Supporting Democratic Governance through the Governance Initiative: A Review and the Way Forward, details the deficiencies and challenges facing EU delegates in attempting to implement, monitor and provide incentive to recipient countries of the European Development Fund.

**66** See: <http://hdrstats.undp.org>: UNDP Human Development Report 2009, Chad's human poverty rating is ranked 132 among 135 countries for which the index has been calculated.

**67** Africa's Missing Billions - International Arms Flows and the Cost of Conflict. Debbie Hillier. Oxfam International Briefing Paper N° 107. October 2007

**68** Interviews and other reports also indicate that a significant proportion of military expenditures is neither openly declared nor approved by parliament and allocated to the Defence Ministry. The Poverty Reduction Strategy only states what is "officially allocated". Document de Stratégie de Croissance et de Réduction de la Pauvreté au Tchad. Government of Chad. April 2008. pp 108

**69** Chad: Account for 'disappeared' opposition leaders. Human Rights Watch. February 2008.

**70** " In consultation with its EU partners in Chad, Germany supports the process of democratic dialogue initiated by the agreement between the government and the opposition parties signed on 13 August 2007, which was primarily designed to lead to voting rights reform with a view to the parliamentary elections scheduled for mid-2010 and has since largely achieved its objective." Viewed on 11 January 2009.

See: <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Laenderinformationen/01-Laender/Tschad.html>

**71** Document de Stratégie de Croissance et de Réduction de la Pauvreté au Tchad. Government of Chad. April 2008. pp 47

**72** The UN Humanitarian Coordinator is also the head of the United Nations Country Team (includes UNDP and other UN Agencies, such as UNICEF and WHO).